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THE UNIONS-"THE IMPLICIT ENEMY"
RONALD R. DAVENPORT*
... [A ] s we enter the second century of the Negro's emancipa-
tion the most important problem he confronts is how to get
back in the labor market. Dean Louis Pollak'
INTRODUCTION
In a syndicated article, Ralph McGill asks whether the economic
plight of the Negro in the United States will continue to be a statistic
merely for social workers.2 The New York Times, recognizing that "Ne-
groes make up one tenth of the civilian labor force," but that "they ac-
count for one fifth of the unemployed," recommends a federal works
program, similar to that utilized during the depression, to end high Negro
unemployment.' Civil rights leaders meeting in Washington at the behest
of the federal government call for massive federal governmental pro-
grams and new and stronger legislation to combat the problem of Negro
unemployment-as well as many other problems facing the Negro com-
munity." Nonetheless, the air of quietude remains. Unemployment in the
white community is at its lowest level in recent years, the economy is
booming, and the federal government worries about inflation.5 A
"Watts" occurs, a commission is empaneled, a study is issued, and the
Negro's economic plight grows progressively worse." Both federal and
state officials attempt to educate businessmen and labor unions in the
economics of racial discrimination and their community responsibility,
but businessmen and local labor unions covertly and overtly resist
education. The community at large remains indifferent (until, of course,
its safety or economic well-being is threatened by a "Watts"). The
plight of the Negro goes from bad-to worse-to impossible.
Commencing with President Roosevelt's Fair Employment Practices
Commission' and culminating in President Kennedy's Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity,8 the federal government has been sin-
gularly unsuccessful in ending discrimination in employment and in the
* B.S., 1958, Pennsylvania State University; LL.B., 1962, Temple University Law
School; LL.M., 1963, Yale Law School. Member of Pennsylvania Bar. Professor of Law,
Duquesne University.
1. Comment, 14 BUEFALo L. REv. 76 (1965).
2. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 20, 1965.
3. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1965, § 4, page 10B.
4. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1965, § 1, page 24.
5. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1965, § 1, page 1.
6. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1965, § 1, page 1.
7. Established in 1941.
8. Established in 1961.
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unions.9 This failure is not unique: many states who have fought racial
discrimination in these areas have experienced the same dismal result."
The history of failure must not be continued in the present administra-
tion: a tool exists to attack in part the economic disaster now being ex-
perienced by the Negro community. That tool, the end product of a
series of semi-serious attempts by the federal government to combat
racial discrimination in employment, is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act entitled Equal Employment Opportunity."
Title VII generally prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin."'" This legislation is certainly not as strong
as it could be, and hopefully not as strong as it will be, but it is a be-
ginning. If used aggressively, it may be an effective beginning.
This paper is primarily limited to an examination of sections 703 (c)
and (d) of Title VII which specifically prohibit discrimination by em-
ployers and labor unions in the administration of apprenticeship and
other training programs. Of necessity, other sections of Title VII are
mentioned where appropriate.
"THE IMPLICIT ENEMY"'13
The relationship of the Negro community to the labor movement has
all the characteristics of a serio-comic opera. But instead of the hero
rescuing the heroine in distress and carrying her off to that never-never
land to live happily ever after, he saves her from death, but then does
not know what to do with her. As our opera ends, the heroine not only
must protect herself from the villain, but wonders if she must also receive
protection from her rescuer. To appreciate fully the problems of the Ne-
9. See, 1961 UNITED STATES CoIm:issiON ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT
[hereinafter cited as REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT]; 1963 UNITED STATES COI MISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS REPORT; REPORTS ON APPRENTICESHIP BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES TO THE UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON APPRENTICE-
SHIP]; Strauss and Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination in Apprenticeship, 16
HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1965); Albert, N.L.R.B.-F.E.P.C.?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1963);
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLIYM. L. REV.
563 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sovern).
10. Feild, Hindsight and Foresight about F.E.P.C., 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 16 (1963);
Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical Analysis
With Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 22 (1964); Comment, 74 HARv. L. REV. 526
(1961); Girard and Jaffe, Some General Observations on the Administration of State Fair
Employment Practices Laws, 14 BursTALO L. REv. 114 (1964).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
12. See, § 703(a), Employer Prohibited from Discriminating; § 703(b), Employment
Agency Prohibited from Discriminating; § 703(c), Labor Unions, Employers and Joint
Labor-Management Committees Controlling Training Programs Prohibited from Discrim-
inating.
13. CAYTON AND MITCHELL, BLACK WORKERS AND THE NEW UNIoNS (1936) [hereinafter
cited as CAYToN AND MircHELL].
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gro's relationship to the unions, one must first look at the relationship
between the Negro and the craft unions. From their organization in
the nineteenth century to the rise of the industrial unions of the 1930's,
the craft unions followed a policy of indifference, if not outright hostility,
to the Negro worker. 4 Samuel Gompers, the president of the AFL, paid
lip service to the inclusion of Negroes in craft unions, but he had neither
the support nor the power to accomplish it. 5 The result of this hostility
and indifference was the creation of a feeling of scepticism in the Negro
community as to the sincerity of craft union organizers who attempted
to organize Negro workers. Indeed, the Negro worker felt that with the
coming of an AFL-affiliated union he would either be immediately re-
placed on one pretext or another or eventually be displaced by a white
worker. 6
The attitude of the Negro worker toward AFL unions was quite dif-
ferent, generally speaking, from his attitude toward CIO unions.' 7 First,
CIO unions were organized on a plantwide basis, as contrasted with the
AFL's craft organization. Secondly, contrary to the AFL, the CIO made
extensive use of Negro organizers. In places where the Negro work force
was significant, the CIO unions adopted a policy of "conscious prefer-
ment,"-one or more union officials would be Negroes. Thus, although
the Negro worker had a similar distrust of white CIO officials, he had
more confidence in industrial unions because of the very obvious Negro
participation. As a practical matter, of course, CIO unions did discrim-
inate on a racial basis, but, generally speaking, the CIO followed a
nominal policy of non-discrimination.'
To implement its national policy of nondiscrimination, the CIO or-
ganized a Civil Rights Committee (CRC) to handle racial problems
within the unions. 9 However, "it was clear from the outset that the CRC
was to be primarily a public-relations organization with advisory powers
on racial matters." 2° The CRC has had a rather controversial history in
terms of its relations with the Negro community. In 1949 it was severely
criticized as being little more than "window dressing" and as serving no
useful purpose. 2' Some ten years later, after the AFL-CIO merger, it was
14. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGAIZED LABOR (1964) [hereinafter cited as MAR-




18. ". . . [Ilt would be misleading to give the impression that the CIO automatically
follow equalitarian policies and got Negro support while all AFL locals discriminated and
were shunned by Negroes .... [Slome CIO locals barred Negroes from membership and
others permitted segregated locals." MARSHALL 45.
19. Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination, established in 1942.
20. MARSH:ALL 47.
21. Pittsburgh Courier, Aug. 29, 1949.
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again under attack. At that time the NAACP severely criticized the
unions for the existing discrimination and for failing to do more to elim-
inate discrimination in its member unions.22 In answer to these objec-
tions, the chairman of CRC replied that the basic purpose of CRC was
education, and that no useful purpose would be served by revoking the
charters of member unions which discriminated. 3
Most of the headline-producing discrimination occurs in craft unions.
Craft unions derived their power from exclusion and control of admis-
sion into the profession,24 whereas the industrial unions derived their
power from increased membership which took place after the individual
was hired.25 As a practical matter, the craft unions are not merely dis-
criminatory racially, but discriminate against all who are not a part
of the "family."26 Again speaking practically, one must recognize that
since Negroes were historically prohibited from joining many unions,
this all-inclusive discrimination completely barred Negro participation in
the trade. It is small solace to an unemployed Negro who is either barred
from joining the union or barred from an apprenticeship training pro-
gram on the basis of race to be treated "equally" with a white whose
forebearers at least theoretically had the opportunity to join the union.27
This is not to say that organized labor has not helped the Negro com-
munity. From the beginning the industrial labor movement has been
egalitarian. Dedicated to the improvement of the lot of the working man,
it has supported minimum wage, maximum hours, social security, medi-
care, and other progressive legislation. Certainly such legislation has
directly benefited the Negro community. Labor has also been at the fore-
front in the fight for civil rights for the Negro.2 Without the support of
labor, the passage of the various civil rights bills would have been more
difficult, if not impossible.29 To that extent, the Negro community is in-
debted to labor. However, to rescue the heroine without fully protecting
her from the villain or without providing her with the means to protect
22. Supra note 14.
23. Ibid.
24. Strauss and Ingerman, supra nbte 9; Hill, supra note 10; MARSHALL.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. At least argumentatively there is no difference in this situation from the "grand-
father" clause voting case. The New York State Commission for Human Rights adopts this
analogy in Lefkowitz v. Farrell, C-9287-63 (1964 mimeo).
28. It is interesting to note that the AFL-CIO did not support the march on Washing-
ton. However, individual unions such as the UAW did support the march.
29. George Meany, in testifying before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, not only supported H.R. 8219, a bill to withdraw
federal funds from apprenticeship programs which discriminated on a racial basis, but he
also stated, "The problem demands much more than a piecemeal approach. It demands
vigorous action to stimulate employment; it demands a strong, enforceable fair employment
practices law."
[Vol. 4:627
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herself is the height of cynicism. The obvious result is to leave the heroine
easy prey for the villain, or to subject her to the whims and caprice of
her rescuer. Thus, for the union to espouse the cause of racial equality
while at the same time denying Negro participation in the craft unions
and in apprenticeship training programs, is to call to question the serious-
ness of the AFL-CIO commitment to ending racial discrimination in the
unions.30 In the 1964 Civil Rights Bill the community reaches the
rather ridiculous position of worker versus worker, separated on the basis
of race, with the federal government being required to mediate the dis-
pute.
EXECUTIVE ACTION: A MATTER OF TIMIDITY
Historically, the attack on employment discrimination has been pri-
marily carried by two branches of the federal government: the executive
and the judicial." Responding to the threat of a march on Washington
by Negroes, President Roosevelt, in 1941, issued Executive Order 8802
establishing a Fair Employment Practices Commission. 2 This Cormmis-
sion, however, was limited in its authority to an investigation of defense
industries.3 Subsequently, in 1943, after the Commission had suspended
operations because of a dispute over public hearings on a complaint filed
against a group of railroads and railroad unions, President Roosevelt
issued Executive Order 9346"4 which established FEPC as an autonomous
agency in the Executive Office of the President. He also broadened the
authority of the agency to include all government contractors as well
as to prohibit discrimination in union membership."3 The Roosevelt-
established FEPC went out of existence on June 28, 1946."
In 1948 President Truman issued Executive Order 998O ' establish-
ing a Fair Employment Board within the Civil Service Commission which
had the authority to review the treatment by department heads of com-
30. Some members of the Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination of the CIO
supported the position that the charters of member unions which discriminated should be
lifted. However, a majority of the Committee refused to adopt this position. As mentioned
above, the Director of the combined AFL-CIO Civil Rights Committee specifically stated
that the function of the Committee was education. Thus we see, at best, a commitment by
the union to end discrimination no greater than the inadequate and ineffective commitment
of the various state FEPC.
However, it would be unfair to criticize the AFL-CIO without mentioning the stand
adopted by George Meany supporting legislation to end discrimination in apprenticeship
training. Meany went so far as to threaten to recruit non-union Negroes for governmental
contracts where the craft unions refused to admit Negroes.
31. For a history of federal government executive activity, see REPORT ON EMPLOYNMENT.
32. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
33. Supra note 9.
34. Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943).
35. Supra note 9.
36. Ibid.
37. Exec. Order No. 9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1948).
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plaints alleging racial discrimination. After reviewing the departmental
decision, the Board could make recommendations. If the recommenda-
tions were ignored by the department, the Board had the right to appeal
directly to the President." Approximately one year prior to leaving
office, President Truman created the Committee on Governmental Con-
tract Compliance.3 This Committee, composed of representatives from
industry, the public, and the principal government contracting agencies,
sought to eliminate discrimination in private businesses which dealt
directly with the federal government.
Shortly after taking office, President Eisenhower decided to reorganize
the Committee on Governmental Contracts Compliance established by
President Truman.4o He changed its name to the President's Committee
on Government Contracts and increased its membership to fifteen mem-
bers. To give the Committee status, he appointed then Vice-President
Nixon as its chairman. The Committee had the paper responsibility of
effectuating "the national nondiscrimination policy."' Actually, however,
the various governmental contracting agencies had the primary respon-
sibility of enforcing the nondiscrimination clause of government con-
tracts. Thus, the real function of the Committee was to act in an advisory
capacity to the various governmental contracting agencies.4 2 During his
first term of office, President Eisenhower also established the President's
Committee on Government Employment Policy.43 An interdepartmental
committee operating outside the authority of the Civil Service Commis-
sion, it replaced the Fair Employment Board of the Civil Service Com-
mission, which had been established by President Truman.
President Kennedy, on March 6, 1961, issued Executive Order 1092544
establishing the President's Committee on Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity. Not only did this committee have the responsibility of eliminating
discrimination in employment as practiced by the federal government
and by federal government contractors, but it was also given the respon-
sibility of gaining the cooperation of labor organizations whose members
were engaged in work on government contracts.
The various committees established by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman,
Eisenhower, and Kennedy had in common one basic characteristic: a
38. Supra note 9.
39. Exec. Order No. 10308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1951).
40. Exec. Order No. 10479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953). The REPORT ON EMPLOYaENT
states that this newly constituted committee "attempted to negotiate increased opportunities
for minority group workers in training and recruitment services. Its attempts were largely
ineffective." [Emphasis added.].
41. For a discussion of the evolution of federal employment policy, see REPORT ON
EMPLOYMENT 5.
42. REIORT ON EMPLOYMET.
43. Exec. Order No. 10590, 20 Fed. Reg. 409 (1955).
44. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
[Vol. 4:5,27
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lack of enforcement powers. The various committees were limited to
the use of education, "moral suasion," publicity, and conciliation in their
attempts to handle the problem of employment discrimination. With
the primary responsibility for enforcement of the alleged governmental
policy of non-discrimination resting with the federal agencies, the com-
mittees were reduced to an advisory and consultative capacity. Conse-
quently, they were largely ineffectual. Until the passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Bill, an executive enforcement program with teeth was con-
spicuously lacking. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that
until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, the various Presidents
had not dealt seriously with the problem of employment discrimination.4 5
THE COURT, THE NLRB AND THE DOCTRINE
OF "FAIR REPRESENTATION"
With the rise of unionism in the United States, the Negro was placed
in a somewhat ambivalent position. Clearly, as a working man his interest
lay with the improvement of the working man's power position. The
organization of industry, however, resulted in loss to the Negro of past
employment gains. 6 A good example of this is the oft-cited Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad7 case. In Steele, the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, purporting to act as the representa-
tive of all firemen, executed an agreement the effect of which was to
ultimately exclude Negroes from employment. Fortunately for the Negro
firemen, the Supreme Court ruled that such an agreement was improper
under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act:
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor
organization the right to determine eligibility to its membership,
it does require the union, in collective bargaining and in making
contracts with the carrier, to represent non-union or minority
union members of the craft without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith.4
Thus, the Court established the doctrine of the right of Negro non-union
members to "fair representation," i.e., the right to be free from discrimina-
tion based on race. For the sake of convenience, the attack on union racial
discrimination may be considered as a three-step approach. The first
step is the recognition of the right to fair treatment. The second step
involves the establishment of the right of Negroes to be admitted into
the union. Can a Negro be denied union membership solely on the basis
of race? The above question from Steele indicates that a union may
45. I define "serious" to mean the use of measures which will result in meaningful
change.
46. Supra note 14.
47. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
48. Id. at 204.
1965-1966]
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determine eligibility for membership. Absent a state or federal statutory
bar, the union's right to determine eligibility includes the right to dis-
criminate on the basis of race.49 Given certification of the union by the
federal government, the problem becomes more complex. Is participation
of the federal government merely by its certification of the union as the
sole bargaining agent sufficient to bring into play constitutional safe-
guards? This question was answered negatively in Oliphant v. Brother-
hood oj Locomotive Firemen.° In denying Negro plaintiffs admission into
the union, the district court and the circuit court of appeals ruled that
certification under the Railway Labor Act was insufficient to support a
finding of discriminatory federal action.5" The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.52
In both Steele and Oliphant, the courts were dealing with a privately-
financed attack on union discrimination. The National Labor Relations
Act 53 provides a mechanism for a public attack. For example, if the
National Labor Relations Board determines that a labor practice is
unfair, the Board has the authority to grant the necessary relief. 4 In-
cluded in the definition of an unfair labor practice is the caveat charging
unions with the responsibility of representing non-union members and
minority union members fairly and impartially. Thus, when the National
Labor Relations Board found discriminatory activity in NLRB v.
Miranda Fuel,55 it ruled that Section 7 of the Act gave
employees the right to be free from unfair or irrelevant or invid-
ious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters
affecting their employment. This right of employees is a statu-
tory limitation on statutory bargaining representatives, and we
49. If the union is characterized by the court as a private organization then it has all
the rights of a private organization which includes the right to discriminate on the basis of
race. Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
50. Ibid.
51. "The Federal action taken by an agency of the Congress, was the certification of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen as exclusive bargaining representative
for the bargaining unit involved, which included persons who were not acceptable to member-
ship under the Constitution of the Brotherhood. Actions by the Brotherhood can be
attributed to the Congress only if the act of certification clothes the Brotherhood with
some or all of the attributes of a Federal agency. The court is satisfied that this act is not
sufficient to change the character of the organization from that of a private association to
that of a governmental agency." Supra note 49, at 93.
52. 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
53. 1 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 153-160 (Supp. IV, 1959-1962), amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
54. 61 Stat. 149 (1947) ; 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958).
55. 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), reversed by the United States Court of Appeals on the
basis that the evidence did not support a finding that the union had engaged in "irrelevant
or invidious discrimination" against the employee. N.L.R.B. v. Miranda Fuel Co., 54
L.R.R.M. 2715 (1963).
[Vol. 4:527
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conclude that Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act accordingly pro-
hibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory repre-
sentative capacity, from taking action against any employee
upon considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invid-
ious, or unfair. 6 [Emphasis added.]
To the extent that the employer took part in the union's unlawful activity,
the Board found violations of Sections.8 (a) (1)57 and (3)58 and 8 (b) (2).11
The third step in our attack on union discrimination is the segregated
local. In the landmark case of Metal Workers Union (Hughes Tool Co.),60
the Board was squarely' faced with this problem. In Metal Workers
Union, a white local had negotiated a contract whereby only its members
would be eligible for apprenticeship programs. When a member of the
Negro local unsuccessfully applied for membership in the apprenticeship
program, the white local refused to process his grievance. Ruling that
"a labor organization cannot when acting as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, lawfully exclude, segregate, or otherwise discriminate among
members of the bargaining unit on racial grounds,"'" the Board declared
the refusal to be violative of Sections 8(b)(1)(A)"2 and 8(b) (3)63 of
the Act.
Sanctioning the MWU, the Board rescinded its earlier grant of certifica-
tion and issued a cease and desist order. 4 The severity of the relief
56. Id. at 1587.
57. Sec. 8C(a), "It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with,
or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7."
58. Sec. 8(a)(3) prohibits an employer from discrimination "in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization."
59. Sec. 8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3), or
to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization
has been denied or terminated on some ground other thfan his failure to tender periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining member-
ship."
60. 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964).
61. Id. at 1291.
62. Sec. 8(b)(1) makes it an unlawful labor practice for a union to "(1) restrain or
coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
63. It is an unlawful labor practice for a union "(3) to refuse to bargain collectively
with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subjected to the pro-
visions of section 9(a)."
64. The Cease and Desist order generally prohibited Local I of the Metal Workers Union
from refusing to handle and investigate grievances, where such refusal was based on race or
color, and causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate. The majority in its
upinion found the maintenance of a segregated local required the Board to rescind the earlier
certification order; "Specifically we hold that the Board cannot validly render aid under
Section 9 of the Act to a labor organization which discriminates racially when acting as a
statutory bargaining representative." In support of its position the majority cites Shelley v.
1965-1966]
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granted in this case indicates a strong attitude on the part of the Board.65
The question still remains: will this strong policy be effective in eliminat-
ing union discrimination? There can be no question that it will be suc-
cessful if coupled with other aggressive activities of the federal govern-
ment. By itself, it will be largely ineffective. For example, in this case
the white local of the Metal Workers, to have been ultimately successful,
merely had to reject the Negro worker's petition for some allegedly bona
fide reason. 6 Unions, as have people, manifest some sophistication when
necessary to accomplish a discriminatory purpose.6 7
STATE FEP LAWS: A QUESTION OF COMMITMENT
New York took the lead in establishing the first state commission to
combat employment discrimination; 6 S other states followed New York's
example and set up similar commissions. 9 With the caution of men walk-
ing on eggs, the various state commissions adopted "conciliation, persua-
sion and education" as a basic policy:
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Following Shelley the argument would be that although a union
is a "private organization" and therefore can refuse to admit Negroes, Oliphant v. Brother-
hood oj Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, supra note 48, it cannot discriminate and
receive the aid and assistance of the N.L.R.B.
65. It is interesting to note the change in the attitude of the N.L.R.B. In 1952 the
General Counsel took the position that he could find nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act which
made it an unfair labor practice to bargain discriminatorily and unfairly against excluded
minorities. For a discussion in some detail of the Board's attitude, see Herring, The "Fair
Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination?, 24
MD. L. REV. 113 (1964).
66. One of the criticisms made by one writer in the field of labor relations and the
Negro is that fair representation is defective because "much racial discrimination is
accomplished by discrimination on the basis of seniority or training areas in which Negroes
because of past discrimination do not rank high. This is extremely difficult to attack because
of the wide range of reasonable discriminatory determinations the bargaining agent is
permitted to make." Albert, N.L.R.B.-F.E.P.C.?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 547, 557 (1963).
67. Of course, this criticism is qualified to the extent that Negroes by their participation
in union activities can elect officers who will protect their rights. Rauh, Civil Rights and
Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J. 874 (1957).
68. New York State Commission against Discrimination (S.C.A.D.), N.Y. SESsioN
LAWS, ch. 118, §§ 1-3 (1945).
69. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.190 (1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-371-23-375; CAL.
LAWS, ch. 121 (1959); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 80.24.1-80.24.8 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-563 (1958) ; DEL. LAWS, ch. 337 (1960); HAwAii, H.B. 21 (1963); IDAiro LAWS, ch. 309
(1961); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 29, §§ 17-24 and ch. 127, §§ 214.1-214.5 (1959); IND. STAT.
§ 40-2307 (Supp. 1959); IOWA, H.B. 589 (1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-2463 (1949); ME.
LAWS, ch. 6 (1963); MD. CODE, art. 78A, §§ 7, 7A (1957); MASS. LAWS ANN., ch. 6, § 56,
ch. 151B, ch. 272, § 98B; MIcH. ComP. LAWS 363.11; Mo., S.B. 269 (1961); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 47-289--47-282 (1966) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 338.129; N.J. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, ch. 25
(Supp. 1900); N.M. STAT. §§ 59.9.8-59.9.9 (1953); N.Y. LAWS, ch. 18 (1951); OHio REV.
CODE §§ 4112.01-4112.06, as amended; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 698.064-698.760; PA. STAT. ANN.,
fit. 43, §§ 853-896; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 29.6.4-29.6.9 (1956); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.18-
49.60.37; W. VA. LAWS, ch. 135 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.11-111.97 (1961).
[Vol. 4:527
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Commissions generally place great emphasis on persuasion,
conciliation, and other informal educational procedures. The
commissions normally seek to do more than eliminate dis-
crimination in the particular case; they seek to change practices
which lead to discrimination, and often use the initial com-
plaint as an opening wedge for a general discussion of respon-
dent's personnel policies. Only a few cases reach the stage of
formal hearing. Instead, there is great reliance on the average
firm's desire to do "the right thing" and to avoid unfavorable
publicity."
It (the Commission) has tried to administer the law in an
atmosphere of cooperation, not conflict. It has tried to obviate
the need of a police operation so extensive as to make enforce-
ment impossible. It has tried through education and persuasion
to change the thinking and mores of our people. 1
The result of this failure to adopt a more imaginative and forceful ap-
proach is to render fair employment practice laws completely ineffectual
in significantly affecting employment discrimination. 2 It would be unfair,
however, to criticize state commissions without mentioning their other
problems. Certainly any governmental body involved in the very touchy
area of race relations is faced with an extremely difficult problem-
balancing the demands of civil rights groups against the manifested
hostility and indifference of the community and its political leaders. This
hostility and indifference often takes the form of the creation of a com-
mission with limited authority and even more limited resources. A com-
mission without adequate finances results in a commission of limited
scope and ambition. 73
70. Strauss and Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination in Apprenticeship, 16
HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1965).
71. Spitz, Tailoring the Techniques to Eliminate and Prevent Employment Discrimina-
tion, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 79, 97 (1964). Mr. Spitz at the time of this statement was General
Counsel to the New York Commission. Apparently however, the New York Commission relies
on more than education and persuasion. In Lefkowitz v. Farrell, C-9287-63 (mimeo 1964)
the Commission, in deciding the case of a Negro who was refused admission into the
apprenticeship program of New York Sheet Metal Local 28, took into consideration the
union's historic pattern of discrimination and required Local 28 to adopt objective selection
criteria. After a vigorous battle the Commission's position was subsequently enacted into
law (N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 296(1-a) (a)). For a full discussion of this case see Strauss and
Ingerman, supra note 70.
72. Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical
Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BuALo L. REv. 22 (1964); Feild, Hindsight and
Foresight about F.E.P.C., 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 16 (1964).
73. See, e.g., District of Columbia, Commissioner's Policy Orders, Nov. 25, 1953, April 9,
1958, as amended, May 9, 1961. IND. STAT. § 40-2307 (1956) and Ky. LAWS. ch. 76 (1960).
See also, Feild, supra note 72.
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While the enabling legislation of many commissions grants sufficient
authority to do a job, normally the commission is hampered by its im-
proper attitude."4 Unfortunately, even where a commission has the teeth
to do an effective job, it treats education as its sole solution. This is
not and will not be the answer. Recognizing the necessity of educating
a majority of the community about the problems of race relations and
employment, one is still faced with the duty of translating that education
into effective action. It is rather paradoxical that society teaches certain
standards of community conduct but does not pass and enforce laws to
bring about this result. A commission which limits itself to education
and ignores its enforcement teeth is ab initio of little use to the Negro
community.
75
APPRENTICESHIP AND TRAINING PROGRAMS
"Education and training is the answer; what the Negro must do is
to prepare himself for profitable employment."
The difficulty with these statements (which the Negro hears con-
stantly) is that they fail to take into consideration the very serious prob-
lem Negroes face in obtaining proper training for blue collar and semi-
professional work. Not only must he break through the barrier which
prohibit his admission, but he must also obtain from the training program
a marketable skill. So far, he has been unable to do either because ap-
prenticeship programs are generally governed by racially-oriented joint
union and employer committees. Although the federal government, prior
to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, had adopted a policy of
"no discrimination because of race in the administration of federally
aided programs of vocational education,"76 discrimination was rampant. 77
74. See, e.g., CONN. REV. STAT. § 31-193 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.884(1) (1960);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18.25-4 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 290; OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.08 (Supp. 1959) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 47 §§ 951-953. See generally Pollitt, Racial
Discrimination in Employment: Proposals for Corrective Action, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 59
(1964).
75. Hill, supra note 72, suggests that to make state commissions effective, basic changes
would have to be made which would include:
1. Greater use of mandatory powers.
2. Affirmative action based upon patterns centered approaches instead of the individual
complaint procedures.
3. Drastic reduction in the number of rejected complaints.
4. Public disclosure of basis for settlements.
5. Expanded availability of Commission facilities.
76. Prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, "No statutes explicity outlined
Federal Policy regarding the availability of training for members of minority groups. A
regulation issued in 1948 (13 Fed. Reg. 8789) however does provide: 'In the expenditure of
Federal Funds and in the administration of federally aided programs of vocational educa-
tion, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, or color.'" REPORT ON EmPLOY-
MENT 97. "However, this position as construed by H.E.W. did not prevent the granting of
training funds to segregated schools." Ibid. But since March 22, 1963, approval of M.D.T.A.
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Since many of the vocational training programs are federally financed,
the rather anomalous situation exists in which the federal policy against
discrimination clashes head-on or rather fails to clash with federally-
financed discriminatory training programs.
The training programs available to Negroes not only reflect early 18th
Century American thinking but continue to perpetuate an existing evil."
Traditionally, vocational education has operated on the premise that
the trainee should receive training only in the areas in which he can
obtain employment. Consequently, since the job opportunities of Negroes
have historically been few in number and scope, their vocational training
has generally been limited to those skills the need for which is either
declining or is not expanding at a rate comparable to the growth realized
in other skills for which people are being trained. 9
In its 1961 Report on Employment, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights reported that the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare issued a directive providing that:
Entrance to a vocational class should be based principally upon
three factors:
1. the desire of the applicant for the vocational training of-
fered;
2. his probable ability to benefit by the instructions to be
given; and
3. his chances of securing employment in the occupation
after he has secured the training, or his need for training
in the occupation in which he is already employed.8"
One cannot argue with a position which stresses the desire of an applicant
as a prime consideration. Certainly, no one should be forced to accept
training that he does not desire. If one may assume that "his probable
ability to benefit by the instruction" means the ability of the trainee to
comprehend what is being taught, then the second factor is both reason-
able and proper. It is the third factor which causes concern. Since it is
true that many of the present training programs do not reflect current
job opportunities for Negroes,8 this third criterion would be an improve-
and A.R.A. programs have been contingent upon no discrimination or racial segregation.
1963 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CivIL RIGHTS REPORT 79.
77. REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. "45 C.F.R. 102.85 (Supp. 1957) (no longer in effect) [Emphasis added.]. This has
been superseded by 45 C.F.R. 102.41(3) (1960). . . . However, the removal of the quoted
regulation does not negate H.E.W.'s policy that training should be given only to those who
can benefit by the instruction, as explained over the telephone by the Assistant Director of
Vocational Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, June 26, 1961."
81. Supra note 77.
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ment only to the extent that it would provide training pursuant to an
understanding of available opportunities. It is more than doubtful that this
is sufficient to bring about meaningful change in the Negro's employment
statistics. While the attitude of HEW is more aggressive than that
adopted by various state FEP commissions which limit themselves to
the performance of an educational and conciliation function, it is none-
theless inadequate. It parallels the approach of the Bureau of Appren-
ticeship and Training which seeks to promote the voluntary provision
of training opportunities for Negroes by management and the unions8 2
-an idealistically sound policy. One should not have to be coerced to
do what is right, but should do so voluntarily. However, as was stated by
the Advisory Committee to the Civil Rights Commission in its report
on apprenticeship: "As long as the federal government depends on such
voluntary relationships with management and the unions, perhaps little
real progress can be expected."8 " The federal government must first pro-
vide and require training for qualified Negroes regardless of employment
possibilities. Secondly, it must make every effort toward the utilization
of those skills in which Negroes are trained. 4 Only such an aggressive
policy will break patterns of discrimination and bring about concomitant
change in Negro employment statistics. 85
703(c) AND (d)-WHAT IS. PROHIBITED?
Recognizing that the force of law must be used to improve the Negro
employment status, Congress in the 1964 Civil Rights Bill provided
that:
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor or-
ganization-
(1) to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise
to discriminate against, any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or to clas-
sify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individaul,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities, or would limit such
82. REPORTS ON APPRENTICESHIP 15.
83. Id. at 17.
84. In Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Com. of Steel Wkrs. of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 12
(N.D. Ill. 1963) the court held that the Federal government agencies, the G.S.A. and the
Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, "directly and significantly made possible and aided
in the perpetuation of the Joint Commitee and Union's discriminatory policies" and by so
doing "if not directly at least indirectly" denied "plaintiffs their constitutional rights."
85. The Negro American Labor Council has recommended the establishment of an
AFL-CIO Apprenticeship Program Board to establish uniform apprenticeship standards
and to implement a policy of selection based on merit alone "without regard to nepotism,
cronyism, or race." Supra note 77, at 143.
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employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrimi-
nate against an individual in violation of this section.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any em-
ployer, labor organization, or joint labor-management com-
mittee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs to dis-
criminate against any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employ-
ment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship
or other training.8 6
Paragraph 1 of Section 703 (c) makes it an unlawful employment prac-
tice for a union "to exclude," expel, or discriminate on the basis of race.
Since, however, the debate on this section in Congress was particularly
scant, the question remains as to what Congress actually intended to
prohibit. Certainly Paragraph (1) prohibits the union from having a
"white-only" membership clause in its constitution since such a clause
would work to exclude Negroes strictly on the basis of race.
A more important question, however, is whether or not this section
would bar other discriminatory practices. For example, consider the
requirement that an applicant must be recommended for union member-
ship by two union members.8 7 As a practical matter, such a provision
totally excludes Negroes from membership. Since there are generally
no Negroes in the particular union with such a requirement, it is well
nigh impossible for a Negro applicant to obtain the necessary recom-
mendations for admission. It seems, therefore, that 703(c)(1) would
prohibit unions from establishing such a requirement where its effect is
to bar the Negro from membership.
In Paragraph 703(c) (2) Congress provides that it is an unlawful em-
ployment practice to limit, segregate, or classify membership in unions on
the basis of race. This section also declares illegal any classification of
individuals on the basis of race so as to affect adversely their status as
employees. The effect of this section is two-fold: to prohibit the establish-
ment and the maintenance of the segregated local and to wipe out lines of
seniority based upon race. Thus, in unions which follow a practice of
maintaining segregated locals and separate lines of seniority, Negroes
will be able to "bump" whites of less seniority rather than being limited
strictly to asserting seniority over other Negroes.
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e-2 (1964).
87. Hill, supra note 72.
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Section 703(c)(3), which prohibits union pressure upon employers
for the purpose of discrimination, raises a rather interesting question.
If one may assume that it would violate the provisions of the Act for a
union to establish criteria for membership the effect of which is to bar
Negro membership, then clearly a union cannot refuse to work with
non-union labor who have been denied membership in the union solely
on the basis of race. Thus, in those cases where unions have walked
off the job in order to force an employer to discharge non-union workers,
who have been denied admission to the union strictly on the basis of
race, would not Section 703(c) (3) be violated?
During the course of the debate in both the House and the Senate,
opponents of the employment section of the bill complained that it was
vague and did not provide guidelines for its administrators. Their crit-
icism centered on the fact that the word "discrimination" was not de-
fined. In response, Senator Muskie made the following statement:
Discrimination in this bill means just what it means anywhere:
a distinction in treatment given different individuals because
of their race, religion or national origin. . . . I submit that, read
in their entirety, these provisions provide a clear and definitive
indication of the type of practice which this title seeks to elim-
inate. Any serious doubts concerning its application would, it
seems to me, stem at least partially from the predisposition of
the person expressing such doubt.8
This definition is of course expansive, but the problems which Title
VII attempt to meet are also expansive. It would be impossible for Con-
gress to consider all the possible variations in fact situations which would
render an employer's action legal or illegal. However, the lack of legisla-
tive history should not constitute a problem for the Court. The Court has
at its disposal interpretations by state courts of state FEP laws and
similar interpretations by the National Labor Relations Board.89 In ad-
dition, Congress has provided rather specific prohibitions. It remains
for the Court to utilize this law effectively to accomplish the congres-
sional purpose.90
703 (c) AND (d)-AN EVALUATION IN LIGHT OF AVAILABLE
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
Liberally construed, Sections 703 (c) and (d) bar unions and employers
from any and all types of discrimination the effect of which is to limit
88. 110 CONG. REc. 12193 (daily ed. June 3, 1964).
89. A discussion of state commissions treatment of the term discrimination can be
found in Comment, 74 Hagv. L. REv. 526, 558 (1961) and Comment, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 430,
458 (1964).
90. The Court's role as an initiator of governmental policy pursuant to the Constitution
is discussed in Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and Governmental Action,
70 YAu L.J. 345 (1961).
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or prohibit Negro participation in unions or in job training or appren-
ticeship programs because of race. Since the breadth of the law's mouth
encompasses all of the concomitant discriminatory practices, only the
question of the strength of its teeth remains. An exhaustive analysis of
its teeth, i.e., the enforcement procedures, is outside the scope of this
paper, but, of necessity in evaluating 703(c) and (d), one must con-
sider very generally the law's enforcement procedures. Senator Clark
of Pennsylvania argues that the enforcement procedures in Title VII
rob it of its strength.91 Although the Commission can hear a complaint,
make investigations, and attempt conciliation and persuasion, it cannot
enforce the Act on its own motion. It must instead rely upon the Attorney
General for enforcement of the Act. 2 Clark contrasts this provision with
the House bill93 as passed, which did grant to the Commission initiatory
powers, and with a bill9 4 as reported from his committe9  which dealt
with this same problem. The Senator's bill called for the establishment
of an Equal Opportunity Board and the appointment of an administrator
with the rank of Assistant Secretary of Labor. The administrator would
have the authority to investigate and to make inspections for violations of
the Act. His investigations would not have to be preceded by the filing
of charges. After attempting conciliation, he would have the authority to
initiate a formal complaint before the Equal Opportunity Board. The
Board would have the necessary authority to issue broad remedial orders
to remedy violations. Reviews and enforcement of the Board's orders
would be placed in the court of appeals. The effect of the procedure as
proposed by the Senator's committee is to end the necessity for "long and
costly" trial procedures in the federal district court. The possible
length of the proceedings caused the Senator a great deal of concern, for
in his opinion "justice delayed is justice denied."9
To say that the enforcement procedures provided by the act are inade-
quate is an understatement. Indeed, the Attorney General is empowered
by the Act to bring an action where he finds "a pattern or practice of
resistance" 7 to the rights protected by Title VII; where he believes
the case to be "of general public importance," he can even request a
three-judge court.98 In all probability, however, the Attorney General,
with his many other responsibilities, will exercise the discretion to bring
or not to bring an action with greater restraint than would the Commis-
sion, much to the detriment of the job seeker who is alleging discrimina-
tion.
91. 110 CONG. REC. 12171 (daily ed. June 3, 1964).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964).
93. H.R. REP. No. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
94. S. REP. No. 1937, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
95. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.
96. 110 CONG. REC. 12170 (daily ed. June 3, 1964).
97. Supra note 92.
98. Ibid.
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As a matter of construction and reality, the enforcement procedures of
Title VII make the Commission an employment community relations
service limited to education, persuasion, and conciliation. It is rather in-
teresting to note that one tactic used by southern opponents of Title
VII, in an effort to defeat the bill, was to contrast the unemployment
statistics of northern states with FEP laws with the unemployment
statistics of southern states with no FEP laws, maintaining that the Negro
was actually in a better employment position in states in which no FEP
laws had been enacted. 9 The proponents of Title VII argued that there
were other factors involved in these statistics,'00 but they acknowledged
that even states with FEP laws were in need of the assistance of Title
VII.O' When one considers the fact that state FEP laws, largely ineffec-
tive' 012 have historically been administered on the basis of education,
persuasion, and conciliation, and the additional fact that the proponents
of Title VII recognized the need for a federal law for enforcement in
the North,'10 3 the pulling of the Commission's teeth is rather difficult to
accept.
Education and conciliation on the federal level is not enough. They
have failed on the local level and in all likelihood will fail on the federal
level.'04 Even assuming that education, persuasion and conciliation will
work, they will take time-one thing we do not have, considering the
employment statistics of minority workers and the various racial dis-
turbances throughout the country.
A plan of education plus aggressive enforcement of the provisions of
the Act by the Commission on a day-to-day basis must be adopted.0 5
That old trite expression about a chain being only as strong as its weak-
est link seems particularly appropriate in an evaluation of Section 703 (c)
and (d). As mentioned before, these sections are sufficiently broad that a
liberal interpretation by the courts will meet most if not all of the dis-
criminatory practices heretofore practiced by the unions. However, if
the Commission only conciliates, then it remains at best an open question
as to its own probable effectiveness and that of Sections 703 (c) and (d).
99. 110 CoNG. REC. 12174 (daily ed. June 3, 1964) (remarks of Senator Clark).
100. 110 CONG. REC. 12193 (daily ed. June 3, 1964) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
101. Supra note 92.
102. Supra note 72.
103. Supra note 99; supra note 100.
104. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1964
BROOKLYN L. REv. 96, doubts if much can be accomplished under Title VII. Strauss and
Ingerman, supra note 70, doubt if Title VII will be as effective as presently existing state
laws.
105. Senator Clark recognized the need for a strong Commission in his bill and in his
remarks. Supra note 99.
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CONCLUSION
[T]he present position of the Negro in the economy has been
institutionalized. Unless something basic is done, it will reproduce itself
for years to come."'06
The institutionalization of the Negro at the lower levels of the economy
is the result of many factors: a history of slavery and discrimination,
inadequate schooling, and the absolute prohibition of Negro participation
in some occupations. It was not merely the sometimes conscious-some-
times unconscious racist character of the American economy which has
brought about this situation, it was also the hesitancy of government
when boldness was required." 7 Education, persuasion and conciliation
were largely ineffective, and the government's high level policy of non-
discrimination did not significantly bring about low level effective
action.' Thus, the federal government has never taken the necessary
steps to end the racist character of the American economy.
Mere elimination of the barriers to employment is not the final answer
to the question of Negro employment-the inadequacy of the Negro's
education and training also stands as a barrier. However, a Negro wanting
work can do something about his lack of education and training; he
cannot do anything about his race.
Title VII is like a B- B gun in an arsenal of weapons to attack employ-
ment discrimination; it can sting, annoy, and maim, but it cannot kill.
In light of the gravity of the situation which now faces not only the
Negro community but the community at large, no one can afford to en-
gage in stinging actions. Sections 703(c) and (d) are broad enough to
be effective if properly implemented. To expect the prohibitions of these
sections to bring about meaningful change without a strengthening of
their enforcement procedures is unrealistic. As it presently stands, Title
VII is an elfin step when giant steps are needed.
106. HARRINGTON, THE OTMH A1.4ncA 1962.
107. Supra note 77.
108. Ibid.
1965-1966]

